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ABSTRACT
Historically the profession of lawyers self-regulated their
members’ ethics through codes of conduct and disciplinary
proceedings. This traditional approach to regulating lawyer
performance and behavior has been increasingly subject to scrutiny
and criticism. In some countries, consumer advocates and concern for
access to justice for clients have combined to produce systems of
regulation in which other actors have a more active role in the
regulatory process. In particular, non-lawyer participation in lawyer
discipline provides a voice for persons who as a group may be most
affected by poor lawyering, but if the non-lawyers are lay persons, they
may have little understanding of law or legal practice. This article
considers and compares non-lawyer participation in disciplinary
systems for lawyers in Japan and Singapore, two of the most advanced
economies in Asia. Due to historical reasons, Singapore has a common
law system and Japan has a civil law system, but lawyers in both
countries have played a dominant role in the examination and
discipline of professional infractions. Both countries have also
incorporated non-lawyer participation into the disciplinary process.
Singapore has inserted non-lawyers into the process and Japan has
enhanced non-lawyers’ participation. Why has this occurred, and to
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what effect? Both jurisdictions maintain confidentiality at most or all
stages involving non-lawyers, and performance-related data regarding
the impact of non-lawyers is not readily available. The article therefore
considers the reasons why non-lawyers were included or why their
participation was enhanced, the different degrees of involvement, how
non-lawyer involvement is conceptualized and managed, and the
potential issues that are raised by these approaches.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, lawyers were disciplined for violations of ethical
codes without the public’s participation or access to proceedings.
According to one scholar, the discipline administered by lawyers’
professional organizations was slow, overly lenient to lawyers, and
unresponsive to consumer concerns. 1 In the United States, most states
adhered to a process overseen by the state supreme court, and
administered by a disciplinary board and adjudicated by a hearing
committee composed of legally trained persons. 2 The process was
confidential to protect the reputation of the attorney. 3 Lawyers
investigated and made determinations in part because it was thought
that only lawyers had the expertise necessary to discipline members of
the legal profession. 4 The process in other countries differed but the
exclusion of non-lawyers was fairly consistent. 5 In Europe, the Council
of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (“CCBE”) recommended that
disciplinary proceedings be independent from state authorities, with
primary responsibility resting with the bar or law society. 6
The exclusion of non-lawyers from the attorney disciplinary
process has, however, experienced change. In the United States,
“[l]awyer disciplinary mechanisms have been criticized for their lack
of transparency since at least the 1970s,” 7 and in the 1990s the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) McKay Commission found that
secrecy was the “greatest single source of public distrust” regarding
disciplinary proceedings, which caused great harm to the reputation of
the profession. 8 In response to ABA recommendations and court
challenges, the process in the United States has been opened up at a
variety of stages. 9 In the United Kingdom, the Legal Services Act of
1. Leslie C. Levin, Building a Better Lawyer Discipline System: The Queensland
Experience, 9 LEGAL ETHICS 187, 187 (2006).
2. Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ Responses, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1597, 1599 (1994) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
3. Id. at 1598.
4. Id. at 1599.
5. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 1, at 188-91.
6. COUNCIL OF BAR AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUR., CCBE RECOMMENDATIONS ON
DISCIPLINARY PROCESS FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2 (2007).
7. Panagoitis Delimatsis, The Future of Transnational Self-Regulation: Enforcement and
Compliance in Professional Services, 40 HASTINGS INT’L AND COMP. L. REV. 1, 40 (2017).
8. ABA COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENF’T, LAWYER REGULATION FOR
A NEW CENTURY 30 (1992).
9. Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 1598.
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2007 constituted a major overhaul of the legal profession. One of the
changes was the creation of the Legal Ombudsman (“LO”), an
independent body responsible for overseeing the regulation of all
lawyers in England and Wales. 10 The Chief Ombudsman of the LO
must be a lay person, 11 and their appointment ends if they cease to be
a lay person. 12 In 2018, the LO website identified two members of the
seven person board as non-lay members. 13 The LO handles only
complaints regarding “poor service,” and it refers “issues regarding
professional misconduct” to the relevant approved regulator, “for
example, the Bar Standards Board (for barristers) and the Solicitors
Regulation Authority (for solicitors).” 14 The Solicitors Disciplinary
Tribunal adjudicates alleged breaches of rules and regulations
applicable to solicitors, and at the time this article was written, the
Tribunal had forty-six members, thirty-two Solicitor Members and
fourteen Lay Members, “drawn from a wide range of backgrounds to
reflect the makeup of the profession and, as far as possible, the
public.” 15 Sufficiently serious complaints against barristers are
forwarded to the Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Service (“BTAS”), an
independent organization that arranges disciplinary tribunals. 16
Disciplinary tribunals have three or five people, depending on how
serious the charges are. 17 Tribunal members can be barristers, lay
people, and judges; all tribunals include at least one lay person. 18
The purported reasons for including lay persons in lawyer
disciplinary processes differ across jurisdictions, but arguably
comprise three main concerns. First, there is a perception that selfregulation is self-serving, and that if left on their own, lawyers will
whitewash problems rather than discipline a fellow lawyer. Second,
10. See Legal Services Act (2007), c. 29, Part 6 (Eng. and Wales).
11. Id. § 122(2).
12. Id. § 122(6).
13. About Us: Our Board, LEGAL OMBUDSMEN http://www.legalombudsman.org.uk/
about-us/#our-board [https://perma.cc/D2Z8-GTV7].
14. CATHERINE FAIRBAIRN, COMPLAINTS AGAINST SOLICITORS AND OTHER LAWYERS,
2017, HC Briefing Paper 03762, ¶ 1.6.
15. About
Us,
SOLICITORS
DISCIPLINARY
TRIBUNAL,
http://www.solicitorstribunal.org.uk/about-us [https://perma.cc/QT56-QP3B].
16. The
disciplinary
tribunal
process,
BAR
STANDARDS
BOARD,
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/complaints-and-professional-conduct/disciplinarytribunals-and-findings/the-disciplinary-tribunal-process/ [https://perma.cc/C9A3-DL48].
17. Id.
18. Id.
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there is the goal of consumer protection; lawyers should avoid
protecting their fellow lawyers but they also need direction regarding
the goals to achieve, i.e. client service and maintenance of standards. A
third concern is that unless there is broader participation in the
disciplinary process, it lacks moral authority. 19 This strain of thought
has a basis in democratic representation, 20 and while jury trials are
quite different from lawyer disciplinary processes, they also have
elements in common, as appears in the discussion of the Singapore
context below. 21 When non-lawyers are brought into the process of
investigating and determining lawyer complaints, they arguably
address these three issues, but they raise other concerns. The primary
concern is that only legally trained persons have knowledge of the law
and familiarity with the realities of legal practice sufficient to
competently evaluate alleged breaches of ethical and professional
rules. A related concern is that because they do not have the requisite
legal knowledge, non-lawyers will have to rely on or perhaps be
overwhelmed by legally trained voices, and thereby be limited in their
ability to bring a consumer perspective to bear.
The questions raised in this Article are whether countries in Asia
have engaged with these issues, and if so, what procedures have they
adopted and why? The Article considers Japan and Singapore, two of
the most advanced economies in Asia. For historical reasons,
Singapore has a common law system and Japan has a civil law system.
In both countries, lawyers have played a dominant role in the
examination and discipline of professional infractions, but Singapore
has inserted non-lawyers into the process and Japan has enhanced nonlawyers’ participation. In discussing these changes, the Singapore
section of the Article uses the statutory term “lay person,” while the
Japan section uses the term “non-bengoshi” [non-lawyer]; these terms
mean different things in Japan and Singapore, and do not necessarily
indicate a lack of legal training, but for ease of reference the
introduction and conclusion use the term “non-lawyer.” Why have nonlawyers been included in disciplinary proceedings in Singapore, why
19. Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L. J. 253, 280 (2012).
20. See Valerie P. Hans, Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making: Introduction to Law
& Policy Special Issue, 25 LAW & POL’Y 83, 87 (2003); see also Stephan Landsman,
Commentary: Dispatches from the Front: Lay Participation in Legal Processes and the
Development of Democracy, 25 LAW & POL’Y 173, 173 (2003).
21. See infra Section III.C.
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has their participation been enhanced in Japan, and what effect have
these changes had? Confidentiality is maintained at most stages
involving non-lawyers in both countries, and performance-related data
regarding the impact of non-lawyers is not readily available. The article
therefore considers the reasons why non-lawyers have been included
or had their participation enhanced, the different degrees of non-lawyer
involvement, how non-lawyer involvement is conceptualized and
managed, and the potential issues raised by the respective approaches.
II. JAPAN
In Japan, because of its civil law tradition, lawyers [bengoshi],
prosecutors, and judges are collectively called the legal professionals
[hôsô]. Similar to many other countries, the regulatory regime of
bengoshi ethics includes a disciplinary mechanism. While bengoshi are
self-regulated, people who are not bengoshi (“non-bengoshi”) are also
involved in the disciplinary system, as members of the various relevant
committees. The relevant law, the Attorney Act (“the Act”), 22 requires
that Committees be composed of bengoshi, judges, prosecutors and
“persons of learning and experience.” 23 The law has not defined the
term “persons of learning and experience.” However, the wording
“learning and experience” suggests that potential candidates may be
restricted to people who are educated or further restricted to educated
people of a certain social standing. The bar associations generally do
not publish details regarding the background of the members of their
discipline-related committees. Furthermore, committee members’
identities are generally “confidential information.” 24 However, there is
an impression or belief that these persons of learning and experience
are mainly, if not exclusively, university academics, and particularly
law professors. 25 The disciplinary process is closed to the public. 26 In
2004, a reform enhanced non-bengoshi’s participation as one of the
means to create a more transparent, prompt and effective process in
22. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], Law No. 205 of 1949 (Japan).
23. Id., art. 66-2, ¶¶ 1, 2; art. 70-3, ¶¶ 1,2.
24. Kyoko Ishida, Deterioration or Refinement? Impacts of an Increasing Number of
Lawyers on the Lawyer Discipline System in Japan, 24 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 243, 244 (2017).
25. While this article literally translates the Japanese term as “persons of learning and
experience,” Ishida in her work referred them as “law professor[s]” or “academic expert[s].” See
id. at 244, 256. The term is also translated as “academic expert(s)” in the English version of the
Attorney Act available on the online Japanese Law Translation Database System, which is
operated by the Ministry of Justice, Japan. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22.
26. Ishida, supra note 24, at 247.
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order to secure the people’s trust of the bengoshi profession, legal
professionals, and the whole justice system. This suggests that nonbengoshi are included in the process in order to secure transparency.
This Article argues that, despite the reform, there are structural
weaknesses in the system. The article also analyzes why these
weaknesses were not addressed in the reform.
A. THE LAWYER DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM IN JAPAN
1. Current Disciplinary System
In Japan, a bengoshi must join a local bar association where his or
her office is situated and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations
(“JFBA”), 27 both of which have disciplinary power over him or her.28
A bengoshi may be disciplined if he or she violates the Act, the Articles
of Association of the JFBA (“JFBA Articles”), or the Articles of
Associations of the bengoshi’s local bar association. 29 Disciplinary
sanction may also be imposed if a bengoshi commits an act that harms
the order or reputation of the bengoshi’s local bar association. 30 A
bengoshi may also be disciplined if he or she misbehaves in or outside
professional activities in a manner that impairs the bengoshi’s own
integrity. 31 The disciplined bengoshi will be reprimanded, suspended
from practice for no more than two years, ordered to withdraw from the
local bar association, or disbarred. 32
Each local bar association has a disciplinary enforcement
committee [Kôki I’inkai] (“DEC”) 33 and a disciplinary action
committee [Chôkai I’inkai] (“DAC”). 34 Any person can make a
disciplinary request against a bengoshi at his or her local bar
association. 35 A local bar association can also initiate the process. 36 In
both of these cases, the DEC of the local bar association investigates
and decides whether the case merits examination by the DAC of this
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at arts. 8, 9, 36 ¶ 1; art. 47.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at arts. 56, ¶ 2; art. 60, ¶ 1.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 56, ¶ 1.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 56, ¶ 1.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 56, ¶ 1.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 57, ¶ 1.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 70, ¶ 1.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 65, ¶ 1.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 58, ¶ 1.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 58, ¶ 2.
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local bar association. 37 The JFBA also has its disciplinary enforcement
committee (“JFBA-DEC”) and disciplinary action committee (“JFBADAC”). 38 The JFBA can initiate the process by causing the JFBA-DEC
to investigate whether the case merits examination by the JFBADAC. 39 When a case is referred to it as discussed above, the DAC or
JFBA-DAC decides whether the bengoshi shall be disciplined and what
the penalty will be. 40
When the local bar association issues a ruling not to discipline the
bengoshi concerned, the party who lodged the disciplinary request
(“complainant”) can object to the JFBA. 41 An objection can also be
filed if the local bar association has an unreasonable delay in
concluding the disciplinary procedure or if the complainant thinks the
penalty is unjustly lenient. 42 The objection will be examined by either
the JFBA-DEC or JFBA-DAC. If the case has not been referred to the
local DAC, the JFBA-DEC will examine the matter. 43 If the objection
is made against a no-discipline ruling, 44 and the JFBA-DEC considers
it appropriate to refer the matter back to the local DAC, the JFBA will
rescind the local bar association’s no-discipline ruling and refer the
case back to the local bar association, 45 at which point that DAC shall
examine the case.46
If the matter has previously been referred to the local DAC, 47 the
JFBA-DAC will examine the matter. 48 The JFBA will overturn the
local bar association’s no-discipline ruling and discipline the bengoshi
itself if the JFBA-DAC considers it appropriate to discipline the
bengoshi.49 If the JFBA-DAC considers that there are grounds for an

2.

37.
38.
39.
40.

Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 58, ¶¶ 2, 3, 4.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 70, ¶ 1; art. 65, ¶ 1.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 60, ¶¶ 2, 3, 4.
Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 58, ¶¶ 5, 6; art. 60, ¶¶ 5, 6; art 65, ¶

41. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64, ¶ 1.
42. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64, ¶ 1.
43. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 1.
44. This would be the case when the local DEC decided not to refer the case to the local
DAC.
45. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 2.
46. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 3.
47. The objection is made against a local DAC’s resolution of no-discipline, or on the
ground that the penalty is unjustly lenient, or the local DAC has an unreasonable delay in
concluding the disciplinary procedure.
48. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-5, ¶ 1.
49. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-5, ¶ 2.
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objection that alleges an unjust lenience in the local bar association’s
sanction, it will resolve to change the sanction, and the JFBA will
cancel the local bar association’s original sanction and impose the new
sanction on the bengoshi itself. 50 If the JFBA-DEC or JFBA-DAC
considers there are grounds for an objection made due to unreasonable
delay in conclusion at the local level, 51 the JFBA shall order the local
bar association to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings promptly
and either discipline the bengoshi concerned or issue a no-discipline
ruling. 52
The JFBA-DAC or the JFBA-DEC may resolve to dismiss or
reject an illegitimate or groundless objection. 53 The JFBA will make a
ruling of dismissal or rejection accordingly. 54 No further review can be
sought by the complainant, except that when the JFBA-DEC dismisses
or rejects a complainant’s objection against a local bar association’s
no-discipline ruling, 55 the complainant can apply to the Board of
Discipline Review [Kôki Shinsa Kai] (“BDR”) in the JFBA for a
review. 56 If the BDR considers that the review application shall be
dismissed because it is not legitimate, the JFBA will dismiss the
application. 57 Otherwise, the BDR has to make a resolution either that
the matter shall be remanded back to the local DAC for examination,
which requires approval from two-thirds of its members present, or that
it is unable to adopt such a resolution. 58 In the first situation, the JFBA
will issue a ruling to remand the case back to the original local bar
association. 59 In the second situation, it will reject the review
application. 60 The Act requires the BDR to reflect the public opinion

50. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-5, ¶ 4.
51. Whether the JFBA-DEC or JFBA-DAC handles the objection depends on whether the
case has been referred to the local DAC or not. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at
art. 64-2, ¶¶ 1, 4; art. 64-5, ¶¶ 1, 3.
52. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 4; art. 64-5, ¶ 3.
53. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 5; art. 64-5, ¶ 5.
54. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-2, ¶ 5; art. 64-5, ¶ 5.
55. These are cases that the local DEC had ruled the requests as not meriting the local
DAC’s examination.
56. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-3, ¶ 1.
57. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-4, ¶ 4.
58. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-4, ¶¶ 1, 5.
59. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-4, ¶ 2.
60. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 64-4, ¶ 5.
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of Japan and conduct the necessary discipline review for ensuring the
appropriateness of disciplinary procedures 61
The disciplined bengoshi can use the Administrative Appeal Act62
to appeal to the JFBA regarding the disciplinary sanction the local bar
association imposed. 63 The JFBA-DAC will examine the matter. 64 It
may overturn the discipline sanction, 65 change the penalty or
dismiss/reject the appeal. 66 The bengoshi can institute a lawsuit at the
Tokyo High Court if the JFBA-DAC itself imposed a discipline
sanction 67 or rejected/dismissed his or her appeal. 68 The bengoshi can
also appeal against the Tokyo High Court’s decision to the Supreme
Court, the highest court, whose decision is final.
2. Changes from the Previous System
The disciplinary system described in subsection 1 above has been
in operation since April 1, 2004, when amendments to the Act came
into effect, 69 pursuant to the justice system reform. Subject to a few
exceptions, the pre-reform system was similar. One of the major
changes was the enhancement of non-bengoshi’s involvement in the
investigative stage of the disciplinary procedure. Before the reform,
non-bengoshi members in the local DECs were non-official members;
they could only express opinions and did not have voting or decisionmaking rights. 70 Now, they have voting and decision-making rights.
Further, the BDR was established, and all of its eleven members must
not be current or former hôsô. 71 As discussed above, when the JFBADEC dismisses or rejects a complainant’s objection against a local bar
61. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 71, ¶ 2.
62. Gyôsei fufuku shinsa-hô [Administrative Appeal Act], Law No. 68 of 2014 (formerly
Law No.160 of 1962) (Japan).
63. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 59.
64. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 59.
65. In this situation, the bengoshi concerned is not disciplined.
66. Gyôsei fufuku shinsa-hô [Administrative Appeal Act], supra note 62, at arts. 45, 46.
67. This will be the situation when the JFBA-DAC: (1) upon a complainant’s objection,
examined the matter, overturned the local bar association’s no-discipline ruling and itself
imposed a disciplinary sanction or considered the local bar association’s penalty unjustly lenient
and changed the sanction; or (2) examined the matter upon referral from the JFBA-DEC.
68. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 61, ¶ 1.
69. The amendments were adopted in 2003.
70. Masahiko Takanaka, 懲戒制度の改正 [The Revision of the Disciplinary System],
54(7) 自由と正義 [LIBERTY & JUST.] 14, 16 (2003) (Japan).
71. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 71-2; art. 71-3, ¶ 1.
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association’s no-discipline ruling, the complainant can apply to the
BDR in the JFBA for a review.
Further, before the reform, dissatisfied complainants’ objections
against local DECs’ no-discipline rulings were made to the JFBADAC. 72 If it confirmed the no-discipline ruling, the complainant did not
have further recourse. Now, as described in subsection 1 above,
complainants’ objections against local DECs’ no-discipline rulings are
examined by the JFBA-DEC. If it rejects or dismisses the objection, the
complainant can, as discussed above, apply to the BDR for review.
Therefore, the reform also accorded complainants one more
opportunity of having a local DEC’s no-discipline ruling reviewed.
B. STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES IN THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM
REGARDING NON-BENGOSHI’S PARTICIPATION
This article argues that, despite the justice system reform, the
bengoshi disciplinary system has structural weaknesses that may affect
non-bengoshi’s participation in regulating legal ethics. The weaknesses
concern the composition of the various discipline-related committees,
the appointment of members of these committees, and a lack of further
recourse for the complainants beyond the bar associations. These
weaknesses are analyzed below.
Because the JFBA rarely initiates the disciplinary procedure, 73 the
DECs are the main initial “gatekeepers.” The reform has accorded its
non-bengoshi members with voting and decision-making rights, but the
Act does not specify any required proportion of non-bengoshi members
in the DECs. It only requires each DEC to have four or more committee
members who are to be appointed from bengoshi, judges, prosecutors
and persons of learning and experience. 74 For example, the Osaka Bar
Association DEC had only six non-bengoshi (who were two judges,
two prosecutors and two scholars) among its eighty-six members for
the period from October 2006 to September 2007. 75 It was reported that
the Tokyo Bar Association DEC had only nine non-bengoshi among its

72. Now, as described above, the objection is to the JFBA-DEC.
73. See Ishida, supra note 24, at 247.
74. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at arts. 70-2, 70-3.
75. See Osaka Shunjyu Kai, 春秋会政策集 - 大阪弁護士会の独自の課題 [Osaka
Shunjyu Kai Policy Collection – Osaka Bar Association’s unique challenge], OSAKA-SHUNJYUKAI, http://www.osaka-shunjyu-kai.com/seisaku/honbun7.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2017).
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109 members. 76 According to its 2017 disciplinary enforcement
committee report, the Dai-Ichi Tokyo Bar Association had forty-nine
bengoshi members and six non-bengoshi members in its DEC. 77 If the
situation in the other bar associations is similar, non-bengoshi are the
minority in the DECs and can easily be out-voted.
Systemic weakness is also found in the manner in which DEC
members are to be appointed. The local bar association presidents make
the appointments. 78 While the appointment of judges and prosecutors
shall be made upon recommendations from the judiciary and the public
prosecutors’ office, the bengoshi and other committee members are
appointed upon resolutions adopted at a general meeting of the bar
association. 79 They are therefore chosen by the bengoshi. This article
is not suggesting that the choice is biased or that the bengoshi
committee members tend to be lenient. However, the system, as it is, is
not structured in a way to ensure impactful non-bengoshi participation.
While the complainant can object against a local DEC’s nodiscipline ruling to the JFBA-DEC and, if the latter rejects or dismisses
such objection, apply to the BDR for a review, non-bengoshi members
are in the minority in the JFBA-DEC. Among the thirty JFBA-DEC
members, there are only six non-bengoshi (two judges, two
prosecutors, and two persons of learning and experience). 80 The JFBADEC may delegate matters to sub-committees. 81 The Act only requires
a DEC sub-committee to be composed of at least one bengoshi, one
judge, one prosecutor, and one person of learning and experience.82
However, the JFBA Articles require each JFBA-DEC sub-committee
to have at least seven members who shall be four or more bengoshi,
one judge, one prosecutor, and one person of learning and experience.83
76. See Isao Sugiyama, 綱紀・懲戒制度の概要 [Outline of the Disciplinary System],
10(7) LIBRA 2, 3 (2010).
77. See TERUOKI NINOMIYA, 平成 29 年度綱紀委員会報告 [2017 REPORT OF THE
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT COMMITTEE], 第 一 東 京 弁 護 士 会 会 報 [ICHIBEN
BULLETIN], no.542, 7 (2018).
78. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 66-2, ¶ 1; art. 70-3, ¶ 1.
79. See Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 66-2, ¶ 1; art. 70-3, ¶ 1.
Depending on the locality of the bar association, the recommendations from the public
prosecutors’ office are from the chief public prosecutor or superintending prosecutor.
80. See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, art. 70, ¶ 3. (JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS) (Japan).
81. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 70-6, ¶ 1; ARTICLES OF
ASSOCIATION, supra note 80, at art. 70-3, ¶ 1.
82. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 70-6, ¶ 2.
83. See ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 80, at art. 70-3, ¶ 2.
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Therefore, non-bengoshi members are always in the minority. This is
another structural weakness, although this article is not suggesting any
partiality or impropriety at the JFBA-DEC.
While the complainant may apply to the BDR, which is composed
of non-legal professionals only, to review the JFBA-DEC’s nodiscipline decision, the BDR members are appointed by the JFBA
President upon resolution at a JFBA general meeting, 84 and the BDR’s
role is very limited. It only investigates whether the case shall be
referred to the relevant local DAC. In other words, even when the BDR
accepts the complainant’s objection, the case is only referred back to
the local DAC for examination and decision. The local DAC may
decide not to discipline the bengoshi. This is the same for cases referred
to the DACs by the DECs or the JFBA-DEC. 85
The Act has not stipulated a required proportion of non-bengoshi
members in the DACs. It was reported that the Tokyo Bar Association
DAC had seven non-bengoshi among its fifteen members. 86 If the
situations in other DACs are the same or similar, non-bengoshi would
be the minority. That was the situation prior to the justice system
reform. 87 Given the profession’s adamant attitude in strictly
maintaining its self-regulation and autonomy, 88 it is highly likely that
non-bengoshi members are still in the minority now.
84. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 71-3, ¶ 1. This Article is not
suggesting that the choice of the BDR members is biased.
85. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 58, ¶ 6; art. 64-2, ¶ 3.
86. See Sugiyama, supra note 76, at 2, 5.
87. The number of bengoshi members exceeded the number of non-bengoshi members by
one. See JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, 弁護士のあり方について [ABOUT HOW BENGOSHI
SHOULD BE] (2000), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai28/pdfs/
28siryou1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CF2-THK3]. This was distributed at the 28th meeting of the
Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”).
88. This is revealed from an analysis of the debate during the justice system reform. For
example, at the twenty-eighth meeting of the JSRC, when questioned by a JSRC member on the
reasons why non-bengoshi DEC members did not have voting power while bengoshi DECmembers did, the then JFBA President replied that there was no need to change this and gave
two reasons: first, so far, the non-bengoshi DEC members’ opinions were respected and not
ignored and the DEC’s duties were soundly fulfilled; and, second, the bodies with final deciding
power in a disciplinary process were the DACs whose non-bengoshi members had voting power
and there had not been a case of the bengoshi members using their majority to push through a
decision. See 第２８回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 28th Meeting of the
JSRC], http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai28/28gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/NF5CK3GB]. Another example is the Fundamental Plan on the Reform of the Disciplinary System
that the JFBA adopted on February 28, 2002. See 綱紀・懲戒制度の改革に関する基本方針
[Fundamental Plan on the Reform of the Disciplinary System], JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS
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Both the complainant and the bengoshi concerned can take the
matter further to the JFBA-DAC if they are not satisfied with a local
DAC’s decision. The JFBA-DAC has fifteen members: eight bengoshi,
two judges, two prosecutors, and three persons of learning and
experience. 89 Therefore, the majority of the members are bengoshi.
The JFBA-DAC can delegate matters to sub-committees.90 Under the
Act, a DAC sub-committee shall have at least one bengoshi, one judge,
one prosecutor, and one person of learning and experience. 91 However,
the JFBA Articles require a JFBA-DAC sub-committee to have seven
members who are composed of four bengoshi, one judge, one
prosecutor, and one person of learning and experience. 92 Therefore, the
non-bengoshi members are also a minority in the sub-committees.
Resolutions of the JFBA-DAC and its respective sub-committees are
adopted by a simple majority of committee or sub-committee members
who are present. 93 Therefore, the decisions on disciplinary cases are
mainly (if not entirely) in the hands of the bengoshi profession itself.
Further, the JFBA-DAC’s ruling is final and binding on the
complainant. In contrast, the disciplined bengoshi concerned can
institute a lawsuit at the Tokyo High Court. Complainants also have no
further recourse (for example, the courts) regarding a no-discipline
ruling from the BDR. Both the BDR and the JFBA-DAC are
established within the JFBA. 94 Therefore, the complainants have no
further recourse beyond the JFBA.
C. WHY WERE THE SYSTEMIC WEAKNESSES NOT ADDRESSED
IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM?
Under the justice system reform, changes were made to the
bengoshi disciplinary system pursuant to the recommendations from
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai2/2siryou_be3.html
[https://perma.cc/QBQ4-TXM8] [hereinafter JFBA Fundamental Plan]. At the very beginning
of this document, the JFBA stated that the reform of the disciplinary system was from the
perspective of maintaining and developing the profession’s autonomy. In other words, it argued
for maintenance of its self-regulation.
89. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 80, at art. 69-2.
90. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 66-5; ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION,
supra note 80, at art. 69-4, ¶ 1.
91. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 66-5, ¶ 2.
92. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 80, at art. 69-4, ¶ 2.
93. ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, supra note 80, at art. 69-3, ¶ 2; art. 69-4, ¶ 3.
94. Bengoshi-hô [Attorney Act], supra note 22, at art. 65, ¶ 1; art. 71, ¶ 1.
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the Justice System Reform Council (“JSRC”) and the deliberations at
the Legal Profession System Advisory Committee (“LPSAC”). The
JSRC was established in 1999 to discuss the role of the justice system
in Japan in the 21st century and make recommendations. 95 It presented
its recommendations in a report (“the JSRC Report”) on June 12,
2001. 96 This report formed the basis for the reform. To implement the
reform, the Office for Promotion of Justice System Reform (“the
Promotion Office”) was established in December 2001. It had eleven
advisory committees to deliberate on the details of the reform in
different areas. Among them, the LPSAC handled issues concerning
the system of the legal professions, including the reform of the
bengoshi disciplinary system. This section of the article analyzes the
deliberations at the JSRC and the LPSAC in order to investigate
whether the existence of the structural weaknesses discussed above was
realized, and if they were identified, why they were not addressed in
the reform. The analysis is based on the minutes of the deliberations
which are available online.
On the issue of reforming the bengoshi disciplinary system, the
JSRC Report made a number of recommendations.
These
recommendations included adjusting the composition of the
membership of the bodies that carry out disciplinary procedures (such
as increasing the number of non-bengoshi members), conferring nonbengoshi members in the DECs with voting rights, and introducing a
system under which the complainants can object to a review body that
is made up of the citizens when their objections to DECs’ decisions
have been dismissed or rejected by the JFBA. 97 It did not specify
details on how this new review system would operate, such as the
consequences when the new review body supports the complainant’s
objection. Would the matter be referred to the local DAC or the JFBADAC? Alternatively, would the review body have the power to consider
95. Shihôseido Kaikaku Shingikai Setchihô [The Act on the Establishment of the Justice
System Reform Council], Law No. 68 of 1998, art. 2 (Japan).
96. See 司 法 制 度 改 革 審 議 会 意 見 書 ー 21 世 紀 の 日 本 を 支 え る 司 法 制 度 ー
[Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council – For a Justice System to Support
Japan in the 21st Century], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
sihouseido/report/ikensyo/index.html
[https://perma.cc/ZBM6-J9ZM],
translated
in
Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council – For a Justice System to Support Japan
in the 21st Century, THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL http://japan.kantei.go.jp/judiciary/2001/
0612report.html [https://perma.cc/4T6M-QTV6].
97. Id.
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whether to discipline the bengoshi and what the sanction would be?
The JSRC Report also did not specify any requirements about the
manner of appointment of non-bengoshi members and their proportion
in the DECs, DACs, JFBA-DEC, and JFBA-DAC. Finally, the JSRC
Report did not provide the complainants any further recourse against
decisions made by the JFBA-DAC or the new review body.
An analysis of the minutes of the JSRC meetings 98 revealed that
there was no discussion about the manner of appointment of the
members of the various discipline-related committees in the bar
associations. This was probably because the pre-reform Attorney Act
already had provisions prescribing the manner in which such members
were to be appointed. The previous version of provisions concerning
DACs and the JFBA-DAC were basically similar to the current version
of the Act. There was no provision in the old Act about the appointment
of JFBA-DEC members and non-bengoshi members in local DECs.
This is because the pre-reform Act did not have provision on the JFBADEC, and prior to the justice system reform, non-bengoshi members in
DECs were non-official members. 99 In any case, the systemic
weakness concerning the appointment of committee members was not
discussed at the JSRC meetings. Therefore, not surprisingly, the JSRC
Report is silent on this issue. It was also not discussed at the LPSAC
meetings. This is expected because the LPSAC was given the task of
implementing the reform pursuant to the JSRC Report.
Regarding the membership of the various discipline-related
committees, 100 the JSRC Report merely recommended “an adjustment
of [their] composition (such as increasing the number of non-bengoshi
members).” There was no specification on the proportion of the
membership. However, an analysis of the minutes of the JSRC
meetings reveals that one JSRC member proposed that non-bengoshi
be a majority in the committees. 101 However, there was no consensus
98. See 司法制度改革審議会[Justice System Reform Council], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM
COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/gijiroku-dex.html [https://perma.cc/XA25WPWP].
99. The system was introduced according to an agreement among the three branches of
the legal professionals in 1979. JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, supra note 87. At most, the nonbengoshi members could only offer their opinions, which the bengoshi members had no
obligations to accept at all.
100. They are the local DECs, the local DACs, the JFBA-DEC, and the JFBA-DAC.
101. Toshihiro Mizuhara, a former prosecutor, brought up the issue at the 44th meeting of
the JSRC. Mizuhara brought up the issue again at the 60th meeting on May 22, 2001 when the
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among the JSRC members. 102 Consensus is the common Japanese
practice of decision-making. 103 Without a consensus, the matter was
not pursued further at the JSRC. In addition, the JSRC arguably had a
very tight time constraint. Although it impressively held sixty-six
meetings from July 27, 1999 to June 12, 2001, 104 the volume of issues
for its deliberation was massive. Many aspects of the justice
administration system were covered. The bengoshi system was only
one of these aspects. 105 Moreover, reform of the disciplinary system
was just one of the many aspects of the reform of the bengoshi
system. 106 Faced with a mammoth task, the JSRC did not have much
time for the reform of the bengoshi disciplinary system. An analysis of
the minutes of the JSRC meetings finds that this issue was mainly
discussed at eight meetings, 107 seven of which were half-day
JSRC deliberated on the draft of the JSRC Report. See 第 44 回司法制度改革審議会議事録
[Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai44/44gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/M2LM-JBMQ]
[hereinafter Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC]; 第 60 回司法制度改革審議会議事録
[Minutes of the 60th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai60/60gijiroku.html
[https://perma.cc/2DUS-97Y7]
[hereinafter Minutes of the 60th Meeting of the JSRC].
102. See Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101; Minutes of the 60th
Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101.
103. This is in contrast to the practice of the minority following the majority. Interestingly,
at the LPSAC meetings, at least regarding the reform of the bengoshi disciplinary system, the
practice of the minority following the majority was seemingly adopted.
104. See 司法制度改革審議会 審議経過 [The Progress of Deliberations at the Justice
System Reform Council], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
sihouseido/report/ikensyo/singikeika.html [https://perma.cc/KL3N-9E9V].
105. Other aspects included expansion of the population of legal professionals (judges,
prosecutors and bengoshi), lay participation in certain criminal trials, the systems of judges and
prosecutors respectively, the legal education and training system, criminal justice system, civil
justice system and alternative dispute resolution. See the JSRC Report, supra note 96.
106. Other aspects included expansion of the scope of bengoshi’s activities, transparency
and reasonableness of legal fees, strengthening the structure of bengoshi’s practices and
internationalization of the profession. See id.
107. JSRC discussed the bengoshi disciplinary system mainly at the thirteenth meeting
(February 22, 2000), the intensive discussion meeting (August 8, 2000), the twenty-eighth
meeting (August 29, 2000), the twenty-ninth meeting (September 1, 2000), the thirty-third
meeting (October 6, 2000), the forty-fourth meeting (January 23, 2001), the forty-sixth meeting
(February 2, 2001) and sixtieth meeting (May 22, 2001). For the minutes of these meetings, see
第 13 回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 13th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST.
SYS.
REFORM
COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai13/13gijiroku.html
[https://perma.cc/CEB3-72Q8]; 司法制度改革審議会集中審議(第２日)議事録 [Minutes of
the Intensive Discussion Meeting of the JSRC (Second Day), THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/natu/natu2gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/2E7J-E284];
第 28 回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 28th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST.
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meetings. 108 In these eight meetings, other aspects of the justice system
reform were also deliberated. 109
At the LPSAC, the Secretariat of the Promotion Office (“the
Secretariat”) had prepared a list of items for discussion and decision,
which was distributed at the LPSAC’s third meeting. 110 On the issue of
SYS.
REFORM
COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai28/28gijiroku.html
[https://perma.cc/FBG4-XEGB]; 第 29 回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 29th
Meeting
of
the
JSRC],
THE
JUST.
SYS.
REFORM
COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai29/29gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/HMZ9-JFDU];
第 33 回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST.
SYS.
REFORM
COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai33/33gijiroku.html
[https://perma.cc/5XMB-NKU8]; Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101; 第
46 回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 46th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS.
REFORM
COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai46/46gijiroku.html
[https://perma.cc/77CK-3V2L]; Minutes of the 60th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101. The
issue had also been briefly or just barely referred to at three other meetings: the fourth, eighth,
and twelfth meetings. For the minutes of these meetings, see 第 4 回司法制度改革審議会議事
録 , [Minutes of the 4th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS. REFORM COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/991026gijiroku4.html [https://perma.cc/7KW6-44SE];
第 8 回司法制度改革審議会議事録 [Minutes of the 8th Meeting of the JSRC], THE JUST. SYS.
REFORM
COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai8/0112gijiroku.html
[https://perma.cc/74MV-AKKJ]; 第 12 回司法制度改革審議会議事録, [Minutes of the 12th
Meeting
of
the
JSRC],
THE
JUST.
SYS.
REFORM
COUNCIL,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sihouseido/dai12/12gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/PK3U-AFW3].
108. The lengths of the seven meetings are 2:00 to 5:20 P.M. for the thirteenth meeting,
1:30 to 4:55 P.M. for the twenty-eighth meeting, 1:30 to 4:35 P.M. for the twenty-ninth meeting,
1:30 to 5:45 P.M. for the thirty-third meeting, 1:30 to 5:10 P.M. for the forty-fourth meeting,
1:30 to 5:10 P.M. for the forty-sixth meeting, and 1:30 to 5:55 pm for the sixtieth meeting. The
exception is the meeting held on August 8, 2000, which had morning and afternoon sessions.
See Minutes of the 13th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 28th Meeting of
the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 29th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of
the 33rd Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC, supra
note 101; Minutes of the 46th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 60th Meeting
of the JSRC, supra note 101; Minutes of the Intensive Discussion Meeting of the JSRC (Second
Day), supra note 107.
109. See Minutes of the 13th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 28th
Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 29th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107;
Minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the
JSRC, supra note 101; Minutes of the 46th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 107; Minutes of the
60th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101; Minutes of the Intensive Discussion Meeting of the
JSRC (Second Day), supra note 107.
110. 綱紀・懲戒手続検討のたたき台（案） [A tentative proposal for examining the
disciplinary procedure (proposal), SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS.
REFORM,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai3/3siryo-g-8.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2KU-9MMZ] [hereinafter Disciplinary Procedure Proposal]. Because of
time constraints, the reform of the bengoshi disciplinary system was not discussed at the LPSAC
third meeting despite being included in the original agenda. For minutes of the meeting, see 法
曹制度検討会（第３回） 議事録 [The Minutes of the 3rd LPSAC Meeting], SECRETARIAT

2018]

NON-LAWYER PARTICIPATION

343

membership of the discipline-related committees, this list did not
contain any proposal for the non-bengoshi members to be the majority.
It only proposed an addition of judges, prosecutors, and persons of
learning and experience to the local DECs as official members. 111 It is
not very clear why there was no mention of the proportion of the
membership, but it seems that the Secretariat’s list was prepared on the
basis of the JSRC Report, the deliberations at the JSRC meetings as
recorded in the minutes, and a document entitled the Fundamental Plan
on the Reform of the Disciplinary System (“JFBA Fundamental
Plan”). 112 At the LPSAC’s fourth meeting, a Secretariat official gave
a detailed explanation about the drafting of certain items on the list.113
Such items were in relation to the consequences when the new review
body considered that the case should be examined by a DAC. 114 The
Secretariat had added two options to the JFBA’s suggestion 115 for the
LPSAC members to discuss and decide. 116 The JFBA proposed that,
when the new review body decided that a matter should be examined
by the DAC, the JFBA-DEC would review the matter again and decide
whether to refer the case to the DAC for examination. 117 In other
words, the new review body’s aforesaid resolution has no binding
power on the JFBA to refer the case to the DAC. Under both options
OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS. REFORM, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/
singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai3/3gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/AZ9Q-MK6D].
111. See Disciplinary Procedure Proposal, supra note 110.
112. It was adopted by the JFBA at its special meeting on February 28, 2002. See JFBA
Fundamental Plan, supra note 88. Copies of the JFBA Fundamental Plan were distributed at the
second LPSAC meeting (held on March 12, 2002). See 第 ２ 回 配 布 資 料 ⼀ 覧 ,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai2/2siryou_list.html
[https://perma.cc/QEQ5-EFTF]. In this meeting, a JFBA Vice-President had reported about the
JFBA’s responses to the justice system reform. For the minutes of this meeting, see 法曹制度
検討会（第 2 回） 議事録, [Minutes of the 2nd LPSAC Meeting], SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF.
FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS. REFORM, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/
kentoukai/seido/dai2/2gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/6E2A-AQ5G] [hereinafter Minutes of the
2nd LPSAC Meeting].
113. For the minutes of the meeting, see 法曹制度検討会（第 4 回） 議事録, [Minutes
of the 4th LPSAC Meeting], SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS.
REFORM,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai4/4gijiroku.html
[https://perma.cc/DFZ2-R9NJ] [hereinafter Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting].
114. Id.
115. He was referring to the suggestion in the JFBA Fundamental Plan that if the new
review body considered that the case should be examined by the DAC, the JFBA-DEC should
re-examine whether the matter should be referred to the DAC.
116. See Disciplinary Procedure Proposal, supra note 110.
117. See JFBA Fundamental Plan, supra note 88.
OF THE
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added by the Secretariat, the new review body’s resolution that the
matter should be examined by the DAC could have binding power on
the JFBA. The options differed regarding the majority required for such
a resolution : two-thirds or a simple majority. 118 The official explained
that the JSRC Report was silent on the issue of whether the new review
body’s opinion should be binding on the JFBA and that this issue was
an indispensable item to be discussed for inclusion in legislation on the
new system. 119 He also pointed out that, at the JSRC deliberations,
there were opinions that the review body’s view should have binding
power, but no JSRC members clearly advocated that binding power
was not needed. 120 They considered that this was an issue the JSRC left
open for future examination. 121 In contrast, there was debate and no
consensus reached at the JSRC meetings regarding the requirement that
non-bengoshi members were to be the majority in discipline-related
committees. 122 That might be a reason why the issue was not included
in the Secretariat’s list. In any case, an analysis of the minutes of the
LPSAC meetings indicates that no LPSAC member had raised
arguments against the proposal in the JFBA Fundamental Plan for the
bengoshi members to be in the majority in the discipline-related
committees. 123 This might be a relatively less important issue for the
LPSAC members. The discussions about the bengoshi disciplinary
system at the meetings were mainly, if not overwhelmingly, focused on
three issues: whether the BDR’s decision should be binding on the
JFBA, whether a simple majority or two-thirds majority was required
and, if two-thirds majority was required, whether there should be the

118. See Disciplinary Procedure Proposal, supra note 110
119. See Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The Secretariat official pointed this out in his explanation at the fourth LPSAC
meeting. Id.
123. Minutes of the fourth, fifth, and sixth meetings of the LPSAC, see Minutes of the 4th
LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113; 法曹制度検討会（第 5 回） 議事録, [Minutes of the 5th
LPSAC Meeting], SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS. REFORM,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai5/5gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/
YN3R-JCT2] [hereinafter Minutes of the 5th LPSAC Meeting]; 法曹制度検討会（第 6 回）
議事録, [Minutes of the 6th LPSAC Meeting], SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF
JUST.
SYS.
REFORM,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai6/
6gijiroku.html [https://perma.cc/5W2B-A3MM] [hereinafter Minutes of the 6th LPSAC
Meeting].
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option of requiring the JFBA-DEC to re-examine the case again when
only a simple majority was reached at the BDR. 124
Similar to the JSRC, the LPSAC also faced a time constraint in its
deliberations. Although it was established to focus on reforming the
system of legal professionals, the LPSAC’s work covered many issues.
The scope included all three branches of the hôsô and, regarding the
bengoshi, there were many issues to handle. Regarding bengoshi, the
LPSAC’s work covered not only the disciplinary system, but also
issues such as the liberalization of the restriction on bengoshi’s
assumption of public posts or joining the business sector, promotion of
the establishment of legal consultation centers, and transparency and
reasonableness of legal fees. 125 It also included issues such as the
strengthening of bengoshi’s practice structure, transparency of the
administration of the bar associations, and expansion of the quasi-legal
professions’ permitted scope of practice. 126 There was a tight timeline
for the discussions. Reform of the lawyer disciplinary system was one
of the matters scheduled for inclusion in a bill to be submitted to the
National Diet in its ordinary session from January to June 2003. 127 To
match this schedule, the bill was expected to be drafted and ready
before January 2003. 128 Time would also be required for the drafting
of the bill after the discussions at the LPSAC ended. According to the
schedule that the Secretariat proposed to the LPSAC at its third meeting
(held on April 16, 2002), the latter had to discuss the reform of the
lawyer disciplinary system and several other issues in four meetings to
be held by July 22, 2002, 129 although ultimately five meetings were

124. Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113; Minutes of the 5th LPSAC
Meeting, supra note 123; Minutes of the 6th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 123.
125. 主 な 検 討 事 項 と 検 討 順 序 （ 法 曹 制 度 検 討 会 関 係 ） [Major items for
examination and the order of examination (LPSAC-related)], http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/
sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai2/2siryou2.html [https://perma.cc/AR2P-ANAY].
126. Id.
127. Other matters included the liberalization of the restriction on bengoshi’s assumption
of public posts or joining the business sector and making the legal fees transparent and
reasonable. Id.
128. For the comments provided to the LPSAC by an official of the Secretariat of the
Promotion office, see Minutes of the 2nd LPSAC Meeting, supra note 112.
129. See 法曹制度検討会 進行の枠組み（案） [A Plan for the Proceeding of the
LPSAC (Proposal)], SECRETARIAT OF THE OFF. FOR PROMOTION OF JUST. SYS. REFORM,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/seido/dai3/3siryo-g-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6ZPF-U78L].
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held from April to July in 2002. 130 In reality, the reform of the
disciplinary system was only discussed at three half-day meetings on
May 14, June 18, and July 9, 2002. Further, it was not the only matter
that was discussed at these three meetings. 131 The LPSAC therefore
had a very short period of time to discuss and finalize the details of the
reform.
Regarding the absence of further recourse for the complainants
beyond the JFBA, the analysis above is also applicable. The JSRC
Report did not provide the complainants any further recourse against
the JFBA-DAC’s decisions. There were some discussions at the JSRC
meetings about whether there should be recourse to courts for the
complainants. 132 A main concern was the inequity between the
complainants and the bengoshi concerned. 133 However, there was no
consensus on the issue at the JSRC. 134 It was not included by the
Secretariat as an agenda item for the LPSAC meetings and there was
not much discussion on this issue at the meetings. 135
D. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING JAPAN
In Japan, the justice system reform has enhanced non-lawyer
participation in the lawyer disciplinary process. However, the system
has structural weaknesses. They are the composition of the various
discipline-related committees, the manner in which the members of
130. For the list of the meetings, see 法 曹 制 度 検 討 会
[LPSAC],
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sihou/kentoukai/10seido.html
[https://perma.cc/Z6GNME68].
131. For meeting minutes, see Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113; Minutes
of the 5th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 123; Minutes of the 6th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 123.
132. For example, see Minutes of the Intensive Discussion Meeting of the JSRC (Second
Day), supra note 107; Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101.
133. For example, see Minutes of the Intensive Discussion Meeting of the JSRC (Second
Day), supra note 107.
134. See id.; see also Minutes of the 44th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101; Minutes
of the 60th Meeting of the JSRC, supra note 101.
135. At the fourth LPSAC meeting, an LPSAC member did raise up the issue of no further
recourse for the complainants after JFBA-DAC. A JFBA Vice-President who attended that
meeting responded that under the option that the JFBA proposed, a complainant would already
have the request heard four times, by the local DEC, the JFBA-DEC, the BDR, and then the
JFBA-DEC again, and this was more than the three trials available in civil litigations in courts.
The LPSAC member did not accept the explanation but there was no debate on the issue at the
meeting afterwards. For minutes of the fourth LPSAC meeting, see Minutes of the 4th LPSAC
Meeting, supra note 113. For minutes of the 5th LPSAC Meeting and the 6th LPSAC Meeting,
see supra note 123.
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these committees are to be appointed, and the lack of further recourse
for the complainants beyond the JFBA.
The issue of appointment of committee members was not
discussed at the JSRC meetings. The other two weaknesses were
pointed out at JSRC meetings, but there was no consensus among the
members. Consensus, a traditional Japanese practice of decisionmaking, was adopted at the JSRC regarding the reform of the lawyer
disciplinary system. As a result, the JSRC Report has not specified
reform in these respects. When decisions depend on consensus,
compromises will commonly be needed and negotiations will be
lengthy. However, the JSRC faced a mammoth task, resulting in very
little time for the issue of reform of the bengoshi disciplinary system.
That could also be a factor contributing to the lack of specific and
necessary details on the operation of the BDR in the JSRC Report.
To implement the recommendations in the JSRC Report regarding
the system of legal professionals, which included reform of the lawyer
disciplinary system, the LPSAC was established to advise on the details
for relevant legislation. Because the LPSAC worked on the basis of the
JSRC Report and the deliberations at the JSRC meetings, two of the
three systemic weaknesses were not debated at the LPSAC meetings,
and the other weakness was only briefly raised and discussed. As
analyzed above, its deliberation concerning reform of the bengoshi
disciplinary system was mainly focused on the operation of the BDR,
namely whether its resolution would be binding on the JFBA, how
much of a majority such resolution would require, and whether there
would be an additional option of requiring the JFBA-DEC to reexamine the case. LPSAC was faced with the task of completing this
significant gap in the JSRC Report, but it nevertheless had a tight
timeline to provide details for the drafting of the relevant bill regarding
this issue and other issues.
As stated in the JSRC Report, the aim of the reform of the
bengoshi disciplinary system was to secure the people’s trust in the
bengoshi profession, all legal professionals, and the whole justice
system by making the procedure transparent, prompt, and effective.136
Enhancing the people’s involvement or participation in the procedure
was one of the means to achieve this aim. Enhancing the impact of nonbengoshi on the disciplinary system was not the focus. Even when the
issue of providing complainants an opportunity to seek judicial review
136. For the JSRC Report, see supra note 96.
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of the JFBA-DAC’s decisions was discussed at the JSRC meetings, the
debate was mainly from the perspective of mitigating the inequity
between the bengoshi concerned and the complainants, in that judicial
review was available to the former but not the latter.
Further, at the beginning of the fourth LPSAC meeting, the first
LPSAC meeting that deliberated on reform of the lawyer disciplinary
system, a JFBA Vice-President gave a presentation before the LPSAC
members commenced their discussions. 137 In the presentation, he
separated reform measures into three categories: transparency,
promptness, and effectiveness. He explained the measures that the
JFBA Fundamental Plan proposed for achieving each of these
categories. 138 The reform measures of according voting rights to nonbengoshi DEC members, making them official members, and
establishing the BDR were categorized as having the goal of securing
the transparency of the system. 139 There were no definite opposing
voices from the LPSAC. 140 The criteria of transparency is easily
fulfilled if non-bengoshi are involved in the system, irrespective of the
extent of such involvement.
III. SINGAPORE
A. The Lawyer Disciplinary System in Singapore
In Singapore, the current form of the disciplinary system for
advocates and solicitors 141 is a multi-step process that involves
different stakeholders, including clients, lawyers, the Law Society, and
137. See Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. At the fifth meeting, a LPSAC member had discussed about the BDR from the
perspective of effectiveness of the disciplinary system but he was not addressing the
categorization by the JFBA Vice-President and had not specifically criticized or opposed such
categorization. For minutes of the fifth LPSAC meeting, see Minutes of the 5th LPSAC Meeting,
supra note 123. For minutes of the other two LPSAC Meetings (the 4th and the 6th LPSAC
Meetings), see Minutes of the 4th LPSAC Meeting, supra note 113 and Minutes of the 6th LPSAC
Meeting, supra note 123.
141. A different process, helmed by the Chief Justice, is used for legal service officers and
non-practicing solicitors. Legal Profession Act of 1966 (revised 2009), ch. 161, § 82A (Sing.),
and regulated non-practitioners, § 82B. This Article is based on the Legal Profession Act of
1966 (revised 2009), ch. 161 (Sing.). References to this version are indicated by “Legal
Profession Act,” and other versions are indicated by addition of the year.
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the courts. The system utilizes persons with different backgrounds to
review and determine complaints, including judges, lawyers, lay
persons, and legal service officers, the latter being legally trained
individuals with government posts in the Singapore Legal Service.142
The stages of the disciplinary process that incorporate lay persons are
not public, and there is no publicly available information about how lay
persons impact the disciplinary process. Therefore, this portion of the
article focuses on the factors that led Singapore to adopt lay person
participation. This history suggests that in addition to exerting control
over the bar’s input into the legal system, incorporating lay persons and
legal service officers was meant to shift Singapore away from selfregulation and toward regulation by a wider range of stakeholders. In
particular, lay persons were introduced to institutionalize consideration
of consumer interests. In doing so, Singapore overcame the aversion to
lay person ignorance and incompetence displayed when it limited and
then abolished the jury system in 1960 and 1969.
B. Current Disciplinary System
All Singapore lawyers and foreign lawyers registered with the
Legal Services Regulatory Authority are regulated by the Law Society,
and they are required to comply with the relevant portions of the
professional conduct rules, including the Legal Profession Act 143 and
the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules. 144 Any person, not
just a client, can submit a complaint about a lawyer’s conduct in breach
of professional rules, and such complaints are submitted to the Law
Society, 145 after which the matter is investigated and pursued under the
Legal Profession Act. Because all advocates and solicitors and legal
service officers are officers of the Supreme Court, 146 the Supreme
Court has ultimate disciplinary jurisdiction over them. 147 This
supervision is reflected in various aspects of the Chief Justice’s role in
the disciplinary procedure and the final stage of the most serious
142. Legal Profession Act, § 2 (“‘Legal Service Officer’ means an officer in the Singapore
Legal Service.”).
143. Legal Profession Act.
144. Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 S 706/2015 (Sing.).
145. Legal Profession Act, § 85(1).
146. See id. § 82(1).
147. LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF ASIA: TRADITIONS, ADAPTATIONS AND
INNOVATIONS 365 (E. Ann Black & Gary F. Bell eds., 2011).
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disciplinary cases, a hearing before the Court of Three Judges in the
Supreme Court. Under the common disciplinary framework adopted in
2015, all Singapore lawyers and foreign lawyers practicing law in
Singapore, referred to as “regulated legal practitioners,” 148 are subject
to the same overall professional disciplinary processes. 149 This Article
focuses on the disciplinary process as it applies to advocates and
solicitors, the title for Singapore lawyers. 150
The disciplinary process in Singapore encompasses four main
stages of increasing gravity: the Review Committee and the Inquiry
Committee, which take place under the supervision of the Law Society;
the Disciplinary Tribunal; 151 and the final stage of the Court of Three
Judges, a hearing conducted by the Supreme Court. 152 To proceed
under the disciplinary process, complaints need to meet certain formal
requirements, e.g., be in writing and include information about other
complaints regarding the advocate and solicitor, as relevant. 153 Subject
to a few exceptions, 154 complaints received by the Law Society that
comply with these requirements must be referred by the Council of the
Law Society to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel. 155 The Inquiry Panel
contains the pool of lawyers and lay persons who can be called upon to
serve on the Inquiry Committee that investigates complaints, 156 if the
complaint gets that far.
In addition to complaints from clients, the Council of the Law
Society may refer a matter to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel on its
own motion. 157 Any judicial office holder, the Attorney-General, the
Director of Legal Services, or the Singapore Institute of Legal
148. Legal Profession Act, § 2(1) (“‘[R]egulated legal practitioner’ means an advocate and
solicitor or a regulated foreign lawyer.”).
149. See SINGAPORE MINISTRY OF LAW, CIRCULAR ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
LEGAL SERVICES REGULATORY AUTHORITY, ¶ 5(a)(ii) (2015) (Sing.).
150. Legal Profession Act, § 2(1).
151. The currently constituted “Disciplinary Tribunal” plays the same role but differs from
the “Disciplinary Committee” of earlier versions of the Legal Profession Act; the change to the
current “Disciplinary Tribunal” was made in 2008 in the Legal Profession (Amendment) Act
2008. See Act Supplement No. 19 § 34 (2008) (Sing.). The text of this Article uses both terms,
as contained in the legislation under discussion.
152. See Legal Profession Act, § 98(7), which refers to a “court of 3 Judges.”
153. See id. § 85(1).
154. See id. §§ 85(1A), 85(4A).
155. See id. § 85(1A).
156. The Inquiry Panel is comprised of “advocates and solicitors (whether in practice or
not), regulated foreign lawyers and lay persons.” Id. § 84(1).
157. See id. § 85(2).
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Education may also refer information touching upon the conduct of a
regulated legal practitioner to the Law Society. 158 In response to these
referrals, the Council must refer the matter to the Inquiry Panel
Chairman, 159 or if the “judicial office holder, the Attorney-General, the
Director of Legal Services or the Institute . . . requests that the matter
be referred to a Disciplinary Tribunal, apply to the Chief Justice to
appoint a Disciplinary Tribunal.” 160
Where a complaint is referred to the Chairman of the Inquiry
Panel, the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the Inquiry Panel must
constitute a Review Committee within two weeks. 161 The Review
Committee comprises two persons:
• A chairman, either the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of
the Inquiry Panel, or “an advocate and solicitor member
of the Inquiry Panel of not less than twelve years’
standing”; and
• If the subject of the complaint is:
o an advocate and solicitor, “a Legal Service Officer
who has not less than ten years’ experience”; or
o a regulated foreign lawyer, “a member of the
Inquiry Panel who is a regulated foreign lawyer of
not less than ten years’ standing.” 162
Lay persons are absent from this early filter stage of proceedings.
The two-person Review Committee decides if the complaint has
any substance that must be referred for further inquiry. 163 The Review
Committee can require the complainant or lawyer to answer any
inquiry or to furnish any record that the Review Committee considers
relevant. 164 The Review Committee is required to start its review of the
complaint within two weeks of the constitution of the Review
Committee. 165 If the Review Committee unanimously determines that
the complaint or information is “frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or
158. See id. § 85(3).
159. See id. § 85(3)(a).
160. Id. § 85(3)(b).
161. See id. § 85(6).
162. See id.
163. See Discipline Process, THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE,
http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/Lawyer-Regulation/Discipline-Process [https://perma.cc/J3HETS9A].
164. See Legal Profession Act, § 85(7).
165. See id. § 85(6).
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lacking in substance,” it can direct the Council to dismiss the matter,
providing reasons for the dismissal. 166 The Council must accept this
decision of the Review Committee and is required to write to the
complainant and the lawyer within seven days, stating the reasons why
the complaint was dismissed. 167 If the complaint is not dismissed, it is
referred back to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel for the second stage,
where an Inquiry Committee is appointed to conduct an inquiry into the
complaint. 168
The procedure at the Review Committee level makes some
actions mandatory. For example, the Council is required to accept a
Review Committee’s unanimous determination “that the complaint or
information is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in
substance” and should be dismissed. 169 The procedure imposes time
limits as well. The Chairman of the Inquiry Panel must constitute a
Review Committee for complaints within two weeks, 170 the Review
Committee must begin its review of the complaint within two weeks of
the constitution of the Review Committee, 171 and where the Review
Committee determines that the complaint should be dismissed, the
Council is required within seven days to write to the complainant and
the lawyer, stating the reasons why the complaint was dismissed. 172
The second stage of the disciplinary process is the Inquiry
Committee. If the Review Committee refers the complaint or
information back to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel, the Inquiry
Committee must be constituted within three weeks. 173 The Inquiry
Committee is assembled by the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the
Inquiry Panel, 174 and is comprised of a Chairman, who is an advocate
and solicitor from the Inquiry Panel of not less than 12 years’
standing, 175 an advocate and solicitor 176 and lay person 177 from the
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. § 85(8)(a).
See id. § 85(9).
See id. § 85(10).
Id. § 85(8)(a); § 85(9)(a).
See id. § 85(6).
See id.
See id. § 85(9).
See id. § 85(10).
See id.
See id, § 10(a).
See id, § 10(b)(i).
See id, § 10(c).
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Inquiry Panel, 178 and a Legal Services Officer of not less than 10 years’
experience. 179
The members of the Inquiry Panel as well as the Chairman and
Deputy Chairman of the Inquiry Panel are appointed by the Chief
Justice. 180 The overall number of persons serving on the Inquiry Panel
is determined within the discretion of the Chief Justice. 181 The Chief
Justice may also remove persons from the Inquiry Panel and appoint
persons to fill vacancies on the Inquiry Panel. 182
The Inquiry Panel is comprised of “advocates and solicitors
(whether in practice or not), regulated foreign lawyers and lay
persons.” 183 Both advocates and solicitors and regulated foreign
lawyers must have not less than seven years’ standing, 184 while the
Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Inquiry Panel must have not
less than twelve years’ standing as an advocate and solicitor. 185
In addition to qualifications for regulated legal practitioners and
legal service officers, the Legal Profession Act addresses lay person
qualifications. According to section 2(1), a “‘lay person,’ in relation to
the Inquiry Panel or an Inquiry Committee, means an architect, an
accountant, a banker, a company director, an insurer, a professional
engineer, a medical practitioner or any other person (not being an
advocate and solicitor or a Legal Service Officer) who meets such
criteria as may be approved by the Chief Justice and the AttorneyGeneral.” 186
The Inquiry Committee has deadlines for beginning its work and
reporting its findings. The Inquiry Committee shall commence its
inquiry within two weeks of its constitution. 187 The deadlines for
reporting its findings to the Council depend on whether the Inquiry
Panel has called for any information from the lawyer. 188 If the Inquiry
Committee has decided not to call the lawyer to explain or answer
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id. § 84(1).
See id. § 85(10)(d).
See id. §§ 84(1), 84(5).
See id. § 84(1).
See id. § 84(4).
See id. § 84(1).
See id. § 84(2).
See id. § 84(5).
Id. § 2.
See id. § 86(1).
See id.
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allegations, the Inquiry Committee has two months after the date of its
appointment; in any other case, it must issue its report no later than two
weeks after its last meeting or “three months after the date of its
appointment, whichever is earlier.” 189 If the Inquiry Committee cannot
report its findings within this period due to complexity or serious
difficulties, it can apply to the Chairman of the Inquiry Panel for an
extension of the time, 190 which if granted cannot extend beyond six
months from the date the Inquiry Committee was appointed. 191
However, no “application for an extension of time may be made to the
Chairman of the Inquiry Panel” after two months following the date of
the appointment of the Inquiry Committee. 192 Compared to the Review
Committee stage, the Inquiry Committee stage is subject to more
performance deadlines.
While conducting the inquiry, the Inquiry Committee can appoint
persons to assist in making inquiries, require a person to produce for
inspection any books, documents, or papers related to the inquiry, and
require any person including the advocate and solicitor to give
information in relation to such books, documents, or papers. 193 When
an Inquiry Committee decides that an advocate and solicitor should
answer allegations, the Inquiry Committee shall: deliver a copy of the
complaint or information to the advocate and solicitor, together with
any statutory declarations or affidavits that have been made in support;
give the advocate and solicitor an opportunity to provide any written
explanation he may wish to offer or advise if he wishes to be heard by
the Inquiry Committee; and give due consideration to any explanation
provided. 194
“Any questions arising at any meeting of an Inquiry Committee
shall be determined by a majority of votes of the members of the
Committee,” with the Chairman of the Inquiry Committee having a
second vote to break a tie. 195 It is required that all “[a]ll the members
of an Inquiry Committee shall be present to constitute a quorum for a
meeting of the Inquiry Committee.” 196 The procedure at the Inquiry
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See id.
See id. § 86(2).
See id. § 86(3).
See id. § 86(4).
See id. § 86(12).
See id. § 86(6).
See id. § 85(14).
See id. § 85(15).
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Committee suggests that lay person opinion and participation have
equal weight with the opinions and participation of lawyers and legal
service officers, except in the case of a tied vote.
The Inquiry Committee can essentially make one of three
decisions. If the Inquiry Committee is satisfied that there are no
grounds for disciplinary action, it is required to make that report to the
Council and state the reasons. 197 If the Inquiry Committee determines
that no formal investigation by a Disciplinary Tribunal is required but
that some measures are warranted, it is required to make appropriate
recommendations, 198 such as alternatives including a penalty
appropriate to the misconduct committed, 199 or a reprimand or
warning. 200 Lastly, it can recommend that a formal investigation by a
Disciplinary Tribunal is required, together with the preferred
charges. 201
The Inquiry Committee report goes to the Council of the Law
Society, who must decide the next step within one month of receipt, a
decision which can include referral back to the Inquiry Committee for
further consideration. 202 If the Council determines that there should be
a formal investigation, the Council has to “apply to the Chief Justice to
appoint a Disciplinary Tribunal which shall hear and investigate the
matter.” 203 If the Inquiry Committee determines that a Disciplinary
Tribunal is not necessary, but the Council disagrees, the Council may
request the Chief Justice to appoint a Disciplinary Tribunal. 204
In the third, more serious stage of disciplinary proceedings, the
Disciplinary Tribunal is appointed by the Chief Justice. 205 A
Disciplinary Tribunal can be appointed to review a particular complaint
or for a fixed period of time, within the Chief Justice’s discretion.206
Unlike the Inquiry Committee, where the Chairman of the Inquiry
Panel is required to appoint a committee that includes a lay person, 207
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See id. §§ 86(5), 86(7)(b)(v).
See id. § 86(7)(b)(i)-(iv).
See id. § 86(7)(b)(i).
See id. § 86(7)(b)(ii).
See id. § 86(7)(a).
See id. § 87(1).
Id. § 89(1).
See id. § 87(2)(b).
See id. § 90(1).
See id. § 90(2).
See id. § 85(10)(c).
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lay person participation is not required in the Disciplinary Tribunal and
there is no mechanism for arranging it. The Disciplinary Tribunal
comprises a President, who is a Senior Judge of the Supreme Court, or
has been a Judge or Judicial Officer of the Supreme Court, or is an
advocate and solicitor who is also a Senior Counsel, 208 and as
applicable, either an advocate and solicitor or regulated foreign lawyer
of not less than twelve years’ standing. 209
Proceedings before the Disciplinary Tribunal are more formal
than the preceding stages of the disciplinary process. Any person giving
evidence to the Disciplinary Tribunal shall be legally bound to tell the
truth, 210 and in addition to the procedure articulated in the Legal
Profession Act, 211 subsidiary legislation sets out additional procedures
to be used. 212 A Disciplinary Tribunal is required to work
“expeditiously” but is not subject to the string of deadlines applicable
to the Inquiry Committee, although the Law Society “may apply to the
Chief Justice for directions to be given to the Disciplinary Tribunal if
the Disciplinary Tribunal fails to make any finding and determination
within six months from the date of its appointment.” 213 The
Disciplinary Tribunal makes one of three determinations regarding
advocates and solicitors: that no cause exists for the more severe
disciplinary actions under section 83 of the Legal Profession Act of
being struck off the roll, suspended for a period of time, or censured;
that the advocate and solicitor should be ordered to pay a penalty,
reprimanded, and/or comply with remedial measures; or that there is
sufficient basis for the most severe disciplinary actions under section
83 of the Legal Profession Act. 214 If the Disciplinary Tribunal
determines that “sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under
section 83,” 215 the Law Society “shall without further direction” apply
for an order for the advocate and solicitor to show cause why the
advocate and solicitor should not be punished. 216 Proceedings
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
(Sing.).
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id. § 90(1)(a).
See id. § 90(1)(b).
See id. § 91(5).
See id. § 89-93.
See Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules, G.N. No. S 596/2008 (2010)
Legal Profession Act, § 93(3).
See id. § 93(1).
See id. § 93(1)(c).
Id. at § 94(1).
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regarding the order to show cause are “heard by a court of 3 Judges of
the Supreme Court,” from which there is no appeal. 217
The above review of the Singapore disciplinary procedure
illustrates three distinctive characteristics. First, in addition to
advocates and solicitors, lay persons and legal service officers are
involved in the second stage of the investigatory and decision-making
process, the Inquiry Committee. Currently, while lay person views
carry roughly equivalent weight at the Inquiry Committee, lay persons
are absent from the first stage Review Committee and the third stage
Disciplinary Tribunal. Second, the portions of the disciplinary process
occurring under Law Society supervision are subject to strict time
deadlines, and a number of actions are mandatory under the Legal
Profession Act. Third, the Supreme Court has considerable oversight
powers. Why does the disciplinary process contain these
characteristics, and what are the goals of the current procedure? The
answer lies in the shift in Singapore away from self-regulation and
toward more control of the disciplinary process by stakeholders other
than advocates and solicitors.
C. EXPANDING PARTICIPATION IN THE DISCIPLINARY
PROCESS FOR LAY PERSONS AND LEGAL SERVICE OFFICERS
VIA THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT
The predecessor to the Legal Profession Act was the Advocates
and Solicitors Ordinance. 218 Mr. Justice P. Coomaraswamy drafted the
first Legal Profession Act, 219 which came into force in 1966. 220 Prior
to passage in the late fifties, only 15-20 members out of a Bar of about
180 would attend the Annual General Meeting (“AGM”), at which the
Law Society Committee, the entity that investigated and determined
punishment for professional breaches, was elected. 221 The implication
was that anyone who could persuade twenty sympathizers to attend an
AGM would be able to dictate the composition of the Committee.222
217. Id. at § 98(7).
218. See Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance, c. 188 (1934) (Sing.).
219. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(AMENDMENT) BILL (BILL NO. 20/86)], ¶ 1, at A37 (1986) (Sing.).
220. Legal Profession Act, 1966 (c. 161) (Sing.).
221. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(AMENDMENT) BILL (BILL NO. 20/86)], ¶ 4, at A37 (1986) (Sing.).
222. See id.
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Justice Coomaraswamy was a member of the 1963-64 Committee.223
At the time, there were rumors about someone, who was anticipating
disciplinary proceedings against him, moving to pack the meeting so
that the Committee for 1964-65 would be sympathetic to him. 224
Apparently this plan did not come to pass, but the incident led Justice
Coomaraswamy to draft the first version of the Legal Profession Act.225
Under the 1966 Legal Profession Act, investigation and
disciplinary measures were primarily in the hands of advocates and
solicitors of the Law Society, with a final review provided by the
Supreme Court. At this point, the investigation process had two main
stages. The Council of the Society was required to appoint a standing
five-person Inquiry Committee, comprised entirely of current or former
members of the Council, at the start of each year. 226 Upon receiving
any complaint against a lawyer, the Council would direct the complaint
to this Committee, which would then investigate the complaint and
report its findings to the Council. 227 The Council would then determine
whether a formal investigation would be undertaken by a Disciplinary
Committee or would take other action, 228 with members of the
Disciplinary Committee appointed by the Chief Justice “from time to
time.” 229 Each Disciplinary Committee was made up of between three
and five members, 230 and its function was to conduct a formal
investigation of the complaint referred to it by the Council. At the end
of its investigation, the Disciplinary Committee would submit its report
to the Chief Justice and to the Law Society, and upon request would
provide the report to the advocate and solicitor and the complainant.231
If the Disciplinary Committee determined that “due cause exist[ed] for
disciplinary action” against the lawyer concerned, the Society was
required to proceed with the application for a show cause order under
section 102 of the Act. 232

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id. ¶ 5, at A37.
See id.
See id. ¶ 6, 9, at A38.
Legal Profession Act, 1966 (c. 161) (Sing.), § 88(1).
See id. § 90(1).
See id. § 91(1).
See id. § 94(1).
See id. § 94(2).
See id. § 96(3).
See id. § 97(1).
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Significant amendments were made to the Legal Profession Act
in 1986 due to perceived problems with the way the Law Society
handled complaints and to ensure that persons who governed the legal
profession were persons of integrity. 233 Some of the problems
regarding the handling of complaints, as noted by the Select Committee
assigned to consider the proposed legislative changes, were:
• Occasions in which investigations took an inordinately
long time;
• “[I]ncomprehensible findings” by the Disciplinary
Committees of the Law Society in some cases; and
• Instances when apparently unprofessional behavior was
not taken to task by the Inquiry Committee of the Law
Society, which had dismissed the complaint after its
preliminary investigations. 234
Prior to the 1986 amendments, procedures were such that once a
complaint was before an Inquiry Committee, “a shroud of secrecy
descend[ed] over the whole [proceeding],” 235 because all inquiries by
the Law Society then were strictly confidential. 236 This confidentiality
allowed the public to conclude that the Law Society was trying to
protect its own members by covering up for them. 237 In the case of
Joseph Linus, Mr. Linus was brought before a Disciplinary Committee
for contravening the Solicitor’s Account Rules through
misappropriating client money and permitting an employee who was
not legally trained to act as an advocate and solicitor. 238 A Disciplinary
Committee was appointed on June 29, 1983, but their report was not
submitted until June 4, 1985, almost two years later. 239 Despite
establishing the facts alleged against Linus, the Disciplinary
Committee said that there was no cause of sufficient gravity for
disciplinary action and merely recommended a reprimand. 240 The
Linus case also compared poorly with the case of Thomas Tham, an
advocate and solicitor who allegedly committed criminal breach of
233. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(AMENDMENT) BILL [BILL NO. 20/86], ¶ 2, at B2; ¶ 5, at B11 (1986) (Sing.).
234. See id. ¶ 2, at B2.
235. Id.
236. See id. ¶ 5, at B6.
237. See id. ¶ 5, at B7.
238. See id. ¶ 3, at B4.
239. See id.
240. See id.
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trust. 241 On January 20, 1986, Tham’s client lodged a report with the
police instead of the Law Society. 242 Police investigations were
completed in seven months, and Tham was charged in court on
September 25, 1986. 243 In total, there were eleven cases brought up by
then Attorney-General, Tan Boon Teik, to illustrate the severity of
delays in investigation time. 244
At the time Singapore was determining how to improve its
attorney discipline procedure, there was a precedent outside of
Singapore regarding lay person participation. The Select Committee
noted that as of August 27, 1986, England and Wales had a Solicitors’
Complaints Bureau, a body run by lay persons and entirely separate
from the Law Society, which dealt with complaints against
solicitors. 245 The fact that the Discipline Tribunal of the Solicitors’
Tribunal in England and Wales had lay representatives since 1975 also
served as a support for Singapore to adopt the use of lay persons in the
advocate and solicitor disciplinary system. 246 Unlike the Solicitors
Complaints’ Bureau, where investigation and adjudication of
complaints against solicitors were dominated by lay members, the 1986
amendment to the Legal Profession Act sought to adopt a more lawyerfriendly approach by including lay members as well as members of the
Legal Service. 247
Lay participation was formally introduced into the Singapore
legal disciplinary system through the Legal Profession (Amendment)
Act of 1986. 248 Prior to this amendment, the people who sat on the
Inquiry Committee and Disciplinary Committee were all lawyers. 249
The main reason for introducing a degree of lay representation in the
disciplinary system was to assure the general public who dealt with
legal practitioners that standards were maintained 250 and to “stop the
belief that self-help and mutual forgiveness [was] the way lawyers
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See id.
See id.
See id. ¶ 3, at B4-5.
See id. at B2-B5.
See id. ¶ 5, at B10.
See id. ¶ 78-79, at B26.
See id. ¶ 5, at B13.
48 Parl. Deb. (674) (Sept. 22, 1986) (remarks of S. Jayakumar) (Sing.).
See id. at col. 671.
See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(AMENDMENT) BILL (BILL NO. 20/86)], ¶ 5, at B10 (1986) (Sing.).
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maintain[ed] standards of professional conduct.” 251 It was important
for the legal profession in Singapore to consider the public interest and
maintain standards and the image of the Bar. 252 Singapore academic
Tan Yock Lin stated that lay representation was introduced to “ensure
that the client’s viewpoint [was] taken into account in the investigation
and . . . provide a measure of transparency and public accountability in
the investigation.” 253
The composition of the Inquiry Committee was changed to
include two advocates and solicitors, one lay person, and one legal
officer. 254 The Disciplinary Committee was changed to “(a) a person
from a panel of not more than 5 persons appointed by the Chief Justice
being retired judges or persons who have had not less than 12 years’
experience as advocates and solicitors; (b) an advocate and solicitor
who has in force a practising certificate; (c) a legal officer who has at
least 10 years’ experience; and (d) a member of the Inquiry Panel who
is a lay person.” 255 However, laypersons on Disciplinary Committees
had no right to vote and were not required to be present at every
meeting, nor were they required to be “personally present to constitute
a quorum for the transaction of any business.” 256 As observed by
Singapore academic Jeffrey Pinsler, this took into account “the Law
Society’s objection that persons without a legal background would not
have the necessary understanding of the procedures and matters of law
which arise at this stage of the process,” although lay persons would be
“entitled to observe and participation stresses the new priority of
openness.” 257 The purpose of including the new kinds of members
was to remove grounds for cynicism and criticism of the profession’s
disciplinary processes as a whole, and to show that the public interest
was of some importance in the Disciplinary Committee’s decision.258
Regarding the legal service officers, it was hoped that they would bring
251. 48 Parl. Deb. (674) (Sept. 22, 1986) (remarks of Professor S. Jayakumar) (Sing.).
252. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(AMENDMENT) BILL [BILL NO. 20/86], ¶ 5, at B11 (1986) (Sing.).
253. TAN YOCK LIN, THE LAW OF ADVOCATES AND SOLICITORS IN SINGAPORE AND
WEST MALAYSIA 836 (Butterworths Asia ed., 2nd ed. 1998).
254. See Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 1986, § 8(b) (1986) (Sing.).
255. Id. §11(a).
256. See id. § 11(d); Legal Profession Act (revised 1990), §§ 90(6)-(7).
257. Jeffrey Pinsler, The Singapore Lawyer, 3 L. SOC’Y J. 9 (1987).
258. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(AMENDMENT) BILL [BILL NO. 20/86], ¶ 5 at B13-14 (1986) (Sing.).
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to bear experience in investigation and judge issues more objectively,
as they would be less bothered with the need to generate fees and would
not be open to the same temptations. 259
The reasons for including lay persons and legal service officers in
the disciplinary process as they appear in the Select Committee Report
are relatively clear. They were inserted to act as additional watchdogs
for the disciplinary process and to represent the “consumer interest”.260
This view of how lay persons would interact with lawyers suggests that
lay persons could at some level hold their own against lawyers, but this
view contrasts sharply with the view of roughly twenty years earlier
that lay persons should not act as jurors in criminal proceedings. As a
legacy of its colonial history, Singapore had used jury trials for all
criminal offenses, but in 1960 Singapore restricted the use of juries,
and abolished it altogether in 1969, 261 primarily because of the
perceived ignorance and unsuitability of jurors. The first step in 195960 cut back on the use of juries, from criminal offenses generally to
only capital cases. At the second reading of the relevant bill in
Parliament in 1959, then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew noted that jury
trials increased the importance of lawyer skill and agility in
determinations of guilt or innocence, and that in reality the jury was not
comprised of one’s peers but rather the English-educated population.262
The matter was referred to a Select Committee for further
consideration. In this context, some witnesses expressed faith in the
jury’s ability to bring common sensibilities to justice 263 and asserted
the value of juror participation in the administration of justice, 264 but
there was discussion of jurors being unduly swayed by counsel 265 and
of verdicts that had gone counter to judicial directions. 266 When
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See id.
48 Parl. Deb. (674) (Sept. 22, 1986) (remarks of Professor S. Jayakumar) (Sing.).
See Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act (1969) (Sing.).
See 11 Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates, cols. 565-66 (1959) (Sing.).
See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
(AMENDMENT) BILL, Minutes of Evidence, October 16, 1959, col. 5 (1960) (Sing.).
264. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
(AMENDMENT) BILL, Minutes of Evidence, Oct. 16, 1959, cols. 6, 16; Oct. 23, 1959, cols. 3, 2425, 36, 40, 81, 85-86; Nov. 20, 1959, col. 36 (1960) (Sing.).
265. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
(AMENDMENT) BILL, Minutes of Evidence, Oct. 16, 1959, cols. 21-22, Oct. 23, 1959, cols. 8990 (1960) (Sing.).
266. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
(AMENDMENT) BILL, Minutes of Evidence, Oct. 23, 1959, col. 90 (1960) (Sing.).
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combined with the perceived need to bring the law of Singapore in line
with that of Malaysia, 267 the Select Committee voted in favor of the
bill, 268 and the bill was passed into law. 269
Ten years after cutting back jury trials, the government sought to
abolish the jury entirely. At this point in Singapore, there were “no
opposition members in Parliament, and it was thus unlikely that the bill
would be ‘blocked.’” 270 Then-Minister for Law and National
Development, Mr. E.W. Barker, asserted the unreliability of juries and
stated that judges would provide more predictable verdicts. 271 The
Prime Minister addressed Parliament again on the issue, noting that
jury members seemed overwhelmed with the responsibility of finding
defendants guilty if they knew the death penalty would follow, 272 and
in the face of expert psychiatric evidence were either too impressed or
confused. 273 Again, a Select Committee was convened. Statements in
favor of the jury were submitted, but the Committee also heard
evidence that juries were not up the task, 274 inefficient, and corrupted
or frightened into giving the wrong verdict. 275 The Select Committee
reviewed the verdict in the so-called Peeping Tom case, in which the
jury convicted the defendant of culpable homicide, and not murder, by
a vote of four to three. 276 However, the verdict was flawed as five
persons were required for a verdict in the group of seven. 277 The
mistake was only discovered later, when nothing could be done. 278
There was also confusion regarding the difference between “majority”
and “unanimous.” 279 Per the Deputy Registrar of the High Court, many

267. See Andrew Phang, Jury Trial in Singapore and Malaysia – Unmaking of a Legal
Institution, 25 MALAYSIA L. REV. 50, 53, 54 (1983).
268. See id. at 56.
269. See Ordinance 18 of 1960, Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Ordinance, 1960.
270. Phang, supra note 267, at 57.
271. See 29 Parl. Deb. (33) (remarks of Mr. E. W. Barker) (Sing.).
272. See id. at col. 53.
273. See id. at cols. 53-54.
274. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
(AMENDMENT) BILL, at A19-A22 (1969) (Sing.).
275. See id. at A35, A36.
276. See id. at B3.
277. See Phang, supra note 267, at 61.
278. See id.
279. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
(AMENDMENT) BILL, Minutes of Evidence, September 16, 1969, cols. 20, 23, 29-30, 36, 41-42,
47-48, 51-52 (1969) (Sing.).
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jurors could not read the oath properly. 280 Another problem was that
superstitions prevailed among jurors, such as the belief that a pregnant
woman should not pass the death sentence while carrying a child.281
Representative jurors from the Peeping Tom case asserted that working
class people were not up to the task, which should be left to
intellectuals. 282 At the Third Reading of the Bill, Barker observed that
the Select Committee had confirmed the government’s view, 283 and the
bill abolishing the jury was passed. 284 In an oft-quoted statement from
his memoirs, Lee Kuan Yew stated that he “had no faith in a system
that allowed the superstition, ignorance, biases, and prejudices of seven
jurymen to determine guilt or innocence.” 285
When changes to the lawyer disciplinary process via the Legal
Profession Act were debated in 1986, the 1969 abolition of the jury was
mentioned in Select Committee proceedings in passing. 286 Then Prime
Minister Lee Kwan Yew noted that the reason juries were abolished
was that “Singaporeans were not willing to take the decision that would
lead to severe punishment for the person they are asked to sit in
judgment over.” 287 The view of laypersons as incompetent was no
longer put forward, and in its place was a mixed characterization: lay
persons could act as consumer watchdogs, but they were limited by
their unfamiliarity with the law.
In its submission to the 1986 Select Committee regarding changes
to the lawyer disciplinary process, the Council of the Law Society of
Singapore did not object to some participation by lay persons, but it
defended its record of self-regulation, noting that due to confidentiality
of disciplinary proceedings the public only heard about the most
serious cases. 288 On the assumption “that public participation would
result in a greater awareness of what the profession does in this field
and therefore greater public confidence in the profession, it is to be
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See id. Minutes of Evidence, October 7, 1969, cols. 123, 124.
See id. col. 124.
See id. Minutes of Evidence, September 16, 1969, cols. 26, 32, 37, 43, 49, 56.
See 29 Parl. Deb., (194) (1969) (remarks of Mr. E. W. Barker) (Sing.).
Criminal Procedure Code, supra note 261.
LEE KUAN YEW, MEMOIRS OF LEE KUAN YEW: THE SINGAPORE STORY 144 (1998).
See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(AMENDMENT) BILL [BILL NO. 20/86], ¶¶ 80-81, at B26 (1986) (Sing.).
287. Id. ¶ 63, at B23.
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welcomed in principle.” 289 However, the Council was concerned that
lay persons lacked legal knowledge. 290 This concern led the Council to
object to the inclusion of lay persons on Disciplinary Committees, in
view of the need to understand rules of evidence and procedure relevant
at that stage. 291
In its submission to the Select Committee, The Law Club of the
National University of Singapore agreed with the objective of
providing wider representation in disciplinary proceedings, 292 and
argued that lay representatives should be incorporated into the Inquiry
Panel 293 as well as the Disciplinary Committee, which would help
“[safe-guard] consumer interest and [minimize] the risk of the
profession forwarding its interest at the expense of public interest.” 294
Agreement regarding the ability of lay people to represent the
consumer interest and be a “watchdog” over lawyers, 295 even though it
was conceded that a “lay representative would have to be guided by the
legal minds on questions involving intricacies of the law” if they were
included on the Disciplinary Committee, 296 is a considerable step from
jettisoning jurors from the criminal process because they are ignorant
and swayed by lawyers. The Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 1986
arguably addressed the issues raised by inclusion of lay persons in the
disciplinary process, in part by establishing qualifications for being a
lay person, via the definition of a lay person in connection with an
Inquiry Panel and Disciplinary Committee. 297 Lay persons were
required to have the profession of “architect, accountant, banker,
company director, insurer, professional engineer, medical practitioner
or a person who possesses such other qualifications as may be approved
by the Chief Justice and the Attorney-General.” 298 Lay persons
involved in the disciplinary process would therefore have an education
as well as professional training.
The additional educational requirement for lay persons in the
1986 amendments does distinguish them from the jurors described by
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. ¶ B.6, at A5.
See id. ¶¶ 74-76, at B25.
See id. ¶¶ B11-B12, at A6.
See id. at A24.
See id. at A30.
Id. at A29.
See id. at A2.
Id. at B26.
Legal Profession (Amendment) Act, supra note 254, at § 2.
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the Select Committees who examined the workings of Singapore juries.
However, additional education in general would not give lay persons
legal knowledge, and their inclusion in the 1986 amendments may have
also been prompted by other factors. In Fiat Justitia: A History of the
Law Society of Singapore, Kevin Tan noted that in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew articulated his
expectations for the legal profession and the Law Society in postindependent Singapore:
First, that lawyers show and carry themselves as upright,
honourable members of a respected profession. Second, that
lawyers understand the socio-economic milieu in which they
operate and not blindly apply the foreign legal concepts they learnt
at school. And third, that functional groups like the Law Society
should not only lead by example in the way they conduct their
affairs, but also assist the government in supporting its nationbuilding agenda. 299

According to Tan, the first major confrontation between the Prime
Minister and the Law Society of Singapore concerned disciplinary
proceedings against two advocates and solicitors, T.T. Rajah and David
Marshall. 300 On August 16, 1972, the Council of the Law Society “was
summoned to the Prime Minister’s Office in the Istana grounds to face
a livid Lee Kuan Yew. Lee was furious about what he considered to be
inordinate delays in the disciplinary proceeding.” 301 During the
meeting, Lee scolded the Council, saying that “members of the Bar
lacked discipline and that he was considering taking away the
Council’s powers but had been advised against doing so by his Law
Minister, [E.W.] Barker.” 302 Lee advised the Council that “this would
be his ‘final warning’ and that if the Law Society could not discipline
its members, he would not hesitate to take away their powers and ‘make
fools of the Council members in public.’” 303 In a 1977 speech, the
Prime Minister reiterated these concerns:
There is with lawyers – as with jurors, which we have had to
abolish – an unwillingness to do the unpleasant. If we are to
maintain standards of integrity it means axing those who do
299.
(2017).
300.
301.
302.
303.

KEVIN TAN, FIAT JUSTITIA: A HISTORY OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE 58
See id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
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not measure up to these standards. You know as I do, Mr.
Chairman, that when it came to several crunches in the past
few years, what the Council did was to flinch from the
unpleasant. Instead of seeking to strike a member off the
rolls and pressing for it, it has allowed members to be
suspended for 6 months, or for a year, or for two years. This
is not the way to maintain standards of honourable
conduct. 304
Another factor in the conflict between the Law Society and the
Prime Minister was the Law Society leadership. Tan notes:
By the mid 1980s, there was a sense of restlessness at the Bar,
especially among the younger lawyers, most of whom had been
called to the Bar in 1970s. Many young lawyers felt that the
Council was too placid and that the Society was out of touch with
the general public. They wanted a more vibrant and energetic Bar
who did more to serve the public. 305

During the term of Harry Elias as President, this energy manifested in
the creation of a volunteer lawyer organization to represent
unrepresented criminal defendants, but “this activism within the Bar
was beginning to worry the [People’s Action Party] government who
viewed with grave suspicion any kind of political mobilisation.” 306
After Francis Seow was elected President of the Law Society, he
asserted the equality of the bar with the judiciary in a fiery speech at
the Opening of the Legal Year. 307 He also attracted the attention of the
Prime Minister, who wondered how someone like Seow, with two
previous suspensions, could take on the role of President of the Law
Society. 308
Tan notes that in the following months, “Lee Kuan Yew would
make good his 1972 threat to take the Law Society to task and ‘make
fools’ of its Council ‘in public.’” 309 As the person essentially in charge
of Select Committee hearings on the Legal Profession (Amendment)
304. TAN, supra note 299, at 61 (citing Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Address at the
Annual Dinner on the Law Society of Singapore, at the Shangri-La Hotel (Mar. 26, 1977),
available
at
http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/lky19770326.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N24X-M5NL]).
305. TAN, supra note 299, at 64.
306. Id.
307. See id. at 72-73.
308. Id. at 74.
309. See id.
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Bill, 310 Lee Kuan Yew put members of the Law Society Council on the
stand, “treat[ed] them as hostile witnesses and corner[ed] them with
leading questions and constant interruptions.” 311 Sessions were
recorded and played on prime time television every evening. 312
One issue raised in the Legal Profession Amendment Act was the
Law Society’s ability to comment on pending legislation. In 1986, the
Law Society had issued a press statement questioning the terms of
proposed legislation designed to give the state control over what the
“foreign press” published on Singapore. 313 Jothie Rajah has observed
that the press statement distributed by the Law Society Council was in
line with the Legal Profession Act, which at that time included in the
Council’s functions examining and reporting upon current or proposed
legislation should it think fit. 314 However, the government insisted that
the “Law Society had, by making a public statement, breached stateLaw Society relations,” 315 and had unacceptably entered the political
sphere. Rajah characterizes the effect of this confrontation on the Law
Society by noting that for “almost twenty years after the Hearings, the
Law Society of Singapore stayed out of the public domain.” 316
The other issues in the 1986 amendments to the Legal Profession
Act included the disciplinary process, discussed above, and bar
leadership. In addition to introducing persons other than advocates and
solicitors in the disciplinary process, the amendments provided that
errant lawyers would be disqualified from standing for Council
elections. 317 Cumulatively, these changes indicated a shift away from
self-regulation and toward regulation by a wider group of stakeholders,
but they also had the effect of limiting lawyer participation in the
greater legal system.
After the amendment of the Legal Profession Act in 1986, lay
participation in the Inquiry Committee 318 and the Disciplinary

310. See id. at 81
311. Id. at 80
312. See id.
313. See Jothie Rajah & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Of Absences, Masks, and Exceptions:
Cause Lawyering in Singapore, 31 WIS. INT’L L.J. 646, 658 (2013).
314. See id.
315. See id. at 659.
316. Id.
317. See TAN, supra note 299, at 78.
318. See Legal Profession Act 2001, ch. 161, § 85(10)(c) (2001) (Sing.).
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Committee 319 continued until 2008. 320 Following the Legal Profession
(Amendment) Act of 2008, the Disciplinary Committee was
reconfigured into the Disciplinary Tribunal, and lay persons were
removed from this stage. 321 A main reason was to reduce delay, as
expeditious resolution of complaints was a longstanding concern but it
had proven difficult to get the requisite quorum of lay persons, legal
service officers, and advocates and solicitors within a reasonable period
of time. 322 Currently, lay persons have no representation on the
Disciplinary Tribunal. 323
Lay participation continues to remain a part of the Inquiry
Committee today, 324 as does the requirement that lay persons have
education and professional training. 325 A recent development in the
composition of Inquiry Committees has been the recruitment of law
professors as lay persons. 326 Appointment of law professors as lay
persons reinforces the understanding that lay persons are not
necessarily the average citizen, but rather an educated person with
professional standing in society.
D. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING SINGAPORE: THE EDUCATED
PROFESSIONAL AS LAYPERSON
The use of lay persons in the Singapore lawyer disciplinary
process raises a perennial question: how can lay persons participate in
the administration of justice when they do not understand the law?
Singapore has taken two different approaches to this difficulty, at
different times and in different contexts. Lay persons were banished
from the jury in 1969, when their deliberations without legal guidance
led to perceived errors and difficulties in carrying out their duties. Lay
persons have not been returned to this forum, although the issue has
319. See id. § 90(1)(d).
320. See Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 2008 (Sing.).
321. See Legal Profession (Amendment) Act 2008, § 34 (2008) (Sing.).
322. See 84 Parl. Deb., (3192) (2008) (remarks of Mr. K. Shanmugam), (3210) (remarks
of Mr Low Thia Khiang (Sing.); see also Committee to Develop the Singapore Legal Sector,
Final Report (September 2007), at 47-50.
323. See Legal Profession Act, § 90(1).
324. See id. § 85(10)(c).
325. See id. §2 (“lay person”).
326. THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE, NO MOUNTAIN HIGH ENOUGH: ANNUAL REPORT
2014, at 125-26 (2014); THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE: FOR JUSTICE, FOR COMMUNITY,
ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 132-33 (2016).
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been discussed occasionally. 327 More recently, lay persons were
allowed to bring their perspective to bear on allegations of lawyer
misconduct, but participation has been prescribed in two ways. First,
lay persons do not deliberate alone; they investigate complaints jointly
with legal service officers and advocates and solicitors. Legal service
officers were included in the disciplinary process because they do not
have the financial pressure faced by practicing advocates and solicitors,
although the dynamic among these actors is unclear. Operating outside
of commercial law practice, legal service officers could provide ballast
to lay person views, but like lawyers their legal knowledge gives them
an advantage over lay persons. 328 Second, lay persons are required to
have higher levels of education and be members of a profession. These
restrictions on who a “lay person” is suggest that the consumer interest
represented is not necessarily the person on the street, but rather
persons who work with lawyers or engage legal services. The latter
point is supported by the 1986 parliamentary debates regarding
amendments to the Legal Profession Act, when then Minister for Law
S. Jayakumar characterized lay persons as “people who are regular
users of the services of lawyers”. 329 These lay persons have more
experience judging the quality of legal services, and their educational
and professional status arguably better equips them to evaluate the
propriety of lawyer behavior and perhaps assert their opinions in
discussions with legally trained persons.
IV. COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS: WHO IS A WORTHY NONLAWYER IN LAWYER DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS?
Both the Japanese and Singaporean lawyer disciplinary systems
involve people who are not lawyers. Among the various goals of lawyer
discipline, both systems share a similar aim, which is to ensure the
public’s trust in the profession. In terms of regulation, unlike the term
“lay persons” in the Singaporean system, the Japanese term “persons
of learning and experience” is not narrowly defined to include specific
327. See Koh Kheng Lian, Jury better than proposed 5-judge Court of Appeal, STRAITS
TIMES (Sing.), Oct. 30, 1992; Brendan Pereira, Abolishing Jury System Has Not Affected Course
of Justice Here, Say Lawyers, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Feb. 16, 1995; Charles Tan, 12 honest
citizens to decide your fate?, TODAY (Sing.) , Aug. 5, 2005, at 3; Leong Wee Keat, He’s 70 and
ready for another ‘fight’, TODAY (Sing.) , Apr. 26, 2011.
328. See Valerie P. Hans, Lay Participation in Legal Decision Making, 25 L. & POL’Y &
83, 89 (2003) (raising queries regarding integrated tribunals).
329. 48 Parl. Deb. (674) (Sept. 22, 1986) (remarks of S. Jayakumar) (Sing.).
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professions. Lay person participation can be said to be more restricted
in Singapore than in Japan in other ways as well. Lay persons are absent
in the first stage of the Review Committee, and there are no lay persons
on the more serious level of the Disciplinary Tribunal, while in Japan
persons of learning and experience are involved in all discipline-related
committees, at both the investigative stage and the examination stage.
However, in practice the use of non-lawyers in Japan appears to be
more restricted than in Singapore. Persons of learning and experience
seem to be mainly university academics, and particularly law
professors, so their ability to contribute a “layperson” perspective may
be limited. Additionally, although non-lawyers have voting power,
there are structural weaknesses in the system. Two of these
weaknesses, the composition of the various discipline-related
committees and the lack of further recourse for complainants beyond
the JFBA, were recognized at the time of the reform deliberation. They
were not addressed because the JSRC adopted the traditional Japanese
practice of decision-making through consensus, which is timeconsuming, and the JSRC did not reach a consensus in the time
available.
Both systems have incorporated non-lawyer participation in the
lawyer disciplinary process, but they have also both restricted that
participation considerably. Restricting participation by prescribing
qualifications, formally or informally, identifies some non-lawyers as
worthy participants in the lawyer disciplinary process and others as not.
These limitations could address some of the drawbacks of non-lawyers,
such as limited legal knowledge, but structural weaknesses in the
system, like in Japan, may affect non-lawyers’ participation in the
regulation of legal ethics. The question for both systems is whether
their restricted form of non-lawyer participation has brought about the
desired reform. Evidence of impact is primarily an empirical question
that requires data not currently available, because both systems
subscribe to confidentiality of proceedings at the level of non-lawyer
participation. 330 The desirability of confidentiality and the impact of
330. In Singapore, see Legal Profession Act, § 66(1), which states that except as necessary
“for the purpose of giving effect to any resolutions or decisions of the Council and any Review
Committee or Inquiry Committee, confidentiality shall be maintained in all proceedings
conducted by the Council, its staff and the Review Committee or Inquiry Committee”; see also
id. § 93(5), which states that the “findings and determination of the Disciplinary Tribunal shall
be published by the Council in the Singapore Law Gazette or in such other media as the Council
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non-lawyer participation therefore remain active questions for both
systems to consider.

may determine which would adequately inform the public of the findings and determination.”
In Japan, see Ishida, supra note 24 at 244, 247; as pointed out by Ishida, the proceedings in Japan
are “not open to the public” and the committee members have “confidential duty.”

